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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
MARC OPPERMAN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
PATH, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  13-cv-00453-JST    
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS 
 
Re: ECF Nos. 493, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 
500, 501, 503 
 
THIS ORDER RELATES TO ALL 
CASES 
 
Before the Court are nine motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’  Second  Consolidated Amended 
Complaint  (“SCAC”) filed by Defendants Twitter, Inc.; Foodspotting, Inc. and Yelp! Inc.; 
Foursquare Labs, Inc.; Chillingo Ltd., Electronic Arts Inc., Rovio Mobile Oy, and ZeptoLab UK 
Limited; Gowalla Incorporated; Instagram, LLC; Kik Interactive, Inc.; Apple Inc.; and Path, Inc.  
ECF Nos. 493, 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 503.  For the reasons set forth below, the Court will 
grant the Motions in part and deny them in part.   
 
I. BACKGROUND1 
A. Factual History 
This is a putative class action challenging conduct by Apple and various developers of 
applications  for  Apple  devices  (“App  Defendants”).  SCAC, ECF No. 478, ¶ 1.  Plaintiffs allege 
that, during the class period (July 10, 2008 through February 2012), they owned one or more of 
the three Apple products at issue here—the iPhone, iPad, and/or iPod touch (collectively, 
“iDevices”).  Id., ¶ 2.  Plaintiffs allege that Apple engaged in a mass marketing campaign, 
whereby it “consciously  and  continuously  misrepresented  its iDevices as secure, and that the 
                                                 
1 The Court accepts as true the following facts alleged in the complaint for purposes of resolving 
these motions to dismiss.  See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).   
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personal information contained on iDevices—including, specifically, address books, could not be 
taken without their  owners’  consent.”    Id., ¶ 3.   
1. The  “Contacts”  App 
Each iDevice comes pre-loaded  with  a  “Contacts”  mobile  software  application  (or  “App”),  
which iDevice owners may use as an address book to input and store the following information 
about  the  owner’s  contacts:  
 
(1) first and last name and phonetic spelling of each, (2) nickname, 
(3) company, job title and department, (4) address(es), (5) phone 
number(s), (6) e-mail address(es), (7) instant messenger contact, (8) 
photo, (9) birthday, (10) related people, (11) homepage, (12) notes, 
(13), ringtone, and (14) text tone. 
Id.,  ¶  54,  55.    The  “information  in  the  Contacts  App  is  among  the  most  private  and  personal  of  
such information a user maintains on an iDevice.  The address book data reflects the connections, 
associations,  and  relationships  that  are  unique  to  the  owner  of  the  iDevice.”    Id., ¶ 56.  Further, the 
information  stored  therein  “is  highly  personal  and  private,”  and  “is  not  shared,  is  not  publicly  
available, is not publicly accessible, and is not ordinarily obtainable by a third party unless the 
owner  physically  relinquishes  custody  of  his  or  her  iDevice  to  another  individual.”    Id.  
2. Apps’  Use  of  Contact  Information 
According  to  Plaintiffs,  and  notwithstanding  Apple’s  representations  about  the  security  of 
its iDevices, Apple  knew  that  the  devices  permitted  the  App  Defendants’  Apps “to  secretly  upload,  
store,  and  in  some  cases  disseminate  [Plaintiffs’]  personal  and  private  address books as stored in 
the  ‘Contacts’ App  from  the  iDevices  without  [Plaintiffs’]  knowledge  or  consent.”    Id., ¶ 2.  In 
fact,  Plaintiffs  allege,  Apple  provided  its  “assistance  and  cooperation”  to  the  App  Defendants  in  
accessing  and  misusing  iDevice  owners’  address-book information.  Id.  And despite  Apple’s  
“unique  knowledge  that  its  iDevices  were  not  as  secure  as  represented,”  Apple  “consistently  and  
deliberately  failed  to  reveal  its  products’  security  flaws  to  consumers  .  .  .  .”    Id., ¶ 4.  Because of 
“Apple’s  conduct,  Plaintiffs  and  millions of other people purchased iDevices reasonably believing 
that they were secure when, in fact, they are not, and then downloaded Apps, including the Apps 
manufactured by App Defendants, and suffered the unexpected and unauthorized theft of their 
personal data.”  Id.  Plaintiffs allege that they would not have paid as much for their iDevices had 
Case3:13-cv-00453-JST   Document543   Filed03/23/15   Page2 of 34
 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tri
ct
 C
ou
rt 
N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
they  known  of  the  devices’  security  flaws.    Id., ¶¶ 142, 148, 154, 161, 168, 174, 180, 186, 192, 
197, 203, 210, 216, 223, 230. 
3. The App Store and App Development 
Apple offers Apps solely through its App Store, which Apple launched in July 2008.  Id., ¶ 
39.    “Apple  has  exclusive  control  over  what  Apps  are  available  in  the  App  Store,  and  the  iDevices  
are designed to only accept software downloads from the App Store . . . .”    Id.  According to 
Plaintiffs,  “[t]he  App  Store  and  the  availability  of  numerous  Apps  to  perform  different  functions  
are  key  parts  of  Apple’s  marketing  strategy  and  the  popularity  of  the  iDevices.”  Id. ¶ 40.  
In order to offer an App through the App store,  “a  third-party developer must be registered 
as  an  ‘Apple  Developer,’  agree  to  the  iOS  Developer  Program  License  Agreement  with  Apple,  and  
pay  a  $99  yearly  registration  fee.”    Id., ¶ 44.  To further control the Apps offered through its store, 
“Apple  provides third-party developers with review guidelines, and conducts a review of all 
applications  submitted  for  inclusion  in  the  App  Store  for  compliance  with  these  documents.”    Id.  
In addition, Apple provides a host of tools, as well as support services and guidelines to third-
party developers who are licensed to provide Apps through the App Store.  Id., ¶¶ 44, 45, 49, 53.  
The result of these circumstances, according to Plaintiffs, is that “all  iDevice  Apps  were  built,  in  
part,  by  Apple.”    Id., ¶ 46. 
Apple’s  guidelines  provide  that  “Apps  ‘cannot  transmit  data  about  a  user  without  obtaining  
the  user’s  prior  permission  and  providing  the  user  with  access  to  information  about  how  and  where  
the  data  will  be  used.’”    Id.,  ¶  47.    And  “Apple  has  sole  discretion over the App approval process 
and  may  reject  any  App  at  any  time  and  for  any  reason,”  including  a  violation  of  the terms and 
conditions of the licensing agreement, providing Apple with inaccurate information, or if Apple 
learns  the  App  “violates,  misappropriates,  or  infringes  the  rights  of  a  third  party.”    Id. 
Plaintiffs further contend that,  
 
[d]espite  Apple’s  public  statements  that  it  protects  its  iDevice  
owners’  privacy,  Apple’s  App  Developer  Program  tutorials  and  
developer sites (which Apple does not make available to consumers) 
teach App developers just the opposite—how to code and build 
Apps that non-consensually access, use and upload the mobile 
address books maintained on Apple iDevices—precisely what these 
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App  Defendants’  identified  Apps  did.    As  App  developers,  the  App  
Defendants were exposed to and aware of these tutorials and 
developer sites and, on information and belief, their personnel 
utilized them to build the identified Apps. 
Id., ¶ 52.  In  particular,  Plaintiffs  allege  that  Apple’s  iOS  Human  Interface  Guidelines include the 
following statements:  
 
Get information from iOS, when appropriate.  People store lots of 
information  on  their  devices.    When  it  makes  sense,  don’t  force  
people to give you information that you can easily find for yourself, 
such as their contacts or calendar information. 
 
It’s  often  said  that  people  spend  no  more than a minute or two 
evaluating a new app. . . . Avoid displaying an About window or a 
splash screen.  In general, try to avoid providing any type of startup 
experience that prevents people from using your application 
immediately.  Delay a login requirement for [as] long as possible.  
Ideally, users should be able to navigate through much of your app 
and understand what they can do with it before logging in. 
 
If possible, avoid requiring users to indicate their agreement to your 
[end-user license agreement] when they first start your application.  
Without an agreement displayed, users can enjoy your application 
without delay. 
Id., ¶ 88 (emphases omitted). 
B. Procedural History 
This action began as several class actions filed both in California and Texas.2  The four 
actions were consolidated here, where Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Amended Complaint 
(“CAC”), ECF No. 362, on September 3, 2013.   
Defendants filed several motions to dismiss the CAC, and on May 14, 2014, the Court 
granted the motions in part.  ECF No. 471.  The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’  false and misleading 
advertising, consumer legal remedies/misrepresentation, deceit, Unfair  Competition  Law  (“UCL”),  
and conversion claims, which Plaintiffs continue to assert in their SCAC, and also dismissed 
several other claims, which Plaintiffs no longer assert.  Id.  The Court also denied the motions to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s  invasion  of  privacy  (intrusion upon seclusion) claim.  Id. 
Plaintiffs then filed their SCAC.  In the SCAC, Plaintiffs allege conversion and invasion of 
                                                 
2 The Court discusses only California law, as it did in its prior order.  See ECF No. 471 at 2 n.3. 
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privacy (intrusion upon seclusion) claims against all Defendants3, and the following claims against 
only Apple: (1) violation  of  California’s  False  and  Misleading  Advertising  Law (“FAL”), 
Business and Professions Code § 17500, et seq.;;  (2)  violation  of  California’s  Consumer  Legal  
Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code § 1750, et seq.; (3) deceit, California Civil Code § 1709, et 
seq.; and (4) violation of California’s  UCL,  Business  and  Professions  Code  §  17200,  et seq.  ECF 
No. 478, ¶¶ 243-323.  Plaintiffs request certification of a class; an injunction prohibiting 
Defendants from continuing the challenged conduct; actual, compensatory, statutory, presumed, 
punitive, and/or exemplary damages; declaratory relief; restitution; the imposition on Defendants 
of constructive trusts; and fees, costs, and interest.  Id. at 78-79. 
In August 2014, Defendants filed these motions to dismiss.  See ECF Nos. 493, 495, 497, 
498, 499, 500, 501, 503.  All of the motions challenge all claims alleged against each defendant, 
except that Path does not challenge the invasion of privacy (intrusion upon seclusion) claim 
alleged against it.  Id. 
II. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
because the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, there are 
100 or more class members, and the parties are minimally diverse.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).  In resolving a challenge to the adequacy of the jurisdictional allegations in a 
complaint, a court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true, and draws all reasonable 
inferences  in  the  plaintiff’s  favor.    Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted).  If, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court 
finds  that  a  plaintiff’s  claim  does not meet the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, and 
therefore that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring the claim, the Court must dismiss the 
claim for lack of jurisdiction.  See Steel  Co.  v.  Citizens  for  a  Better  Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-04 
                                                 
3 Default has been entered against Defendant Hipster, Inc.  ECF No. 346.  Hipster has not filed an 
answer to the SCAC, or filed or participated in any of these motions to dismiss.   
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(1998). 
A court may also dismiss a complaint or claims asserted therein pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under  Rule  12(b)(6)  if  the  complaint  does  not  proffer  “enough  facts  to  state  a  claim  to  relief  that  is  
plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A  claim  has  facial  
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference  that  the  defendant  is  liable  for  the  misconduct  alleged.”    Id.  In considering a motion to 
dismiss, the court accepts the material facts alleged in the complaint, together with all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts, as true.  Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 
2001).  But  “the  tenet  that  a  court  must  accept  a  complaint’s  allegations  as  true  is  inapplicable  to  
threadbare  recitals  of  a  cause  of  action’s  elements,  supported  by  mere  conclusory  statements.”    
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  The Court will dismiss a claim when it is not based 
on a cognizable legal theory or the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support that theory.  
Balistreri v. Pacifica  Police  Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).    
In addition, fraud-based claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 9(b).  This heightened standard applies when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss.  Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985).  Fraud allegations must be 
specific enough to give the defendant notice of the particular misconduct alleged to constitute the 
fraud so that the defendant may defend against the charge.  Id.  In general, allegations sounding in 
fraud  must  contain  “an  account  of  the  time,  place,  and  specific  content  of  the  false  representations  
as  well  as  the  identities  of  the  parties  to  the  misrepresentations.”    Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 
756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007).    On  the  other  hand,  “[m]alice,  intent,  knowledge,  and  other  conditions  of  
a  person’s  mind  may  be  alleged  generally.”    Fed.  R.  Civ. Pro. 9(b).  Similarly, facts that are within 
the defendants’  sole knowledge may be pleaded generally.  Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 
Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). 
If a court dismisses the complaint or a claim alleged therein, it must grant leave to amend 
unless amendment would be futile.  Lucas  v.  Dep’t  of  Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 
1995).  But  where  a  court  has  previously  granted  a  plaintiff  leave  to  amend,  the  court’s  discretion  
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to  deny  leave  to  amend  and  dismiss  a  claim  with  prejudice  is  “particularly  broad.”    See Salameh v. 
Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1322 (2014).  When 
a plaintiff has been granted leave to amend, but has failed to cure the deficiencies identified in an 
earlier complaint, a district court may find that the plaintiff has no additional facts or theories to 
plead, and may therefore dismiss with prejudice.  Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 
F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
IV. APPLE’S  MOTION  TO  DISMISS 
A. Judicial Notice 
In support of its motion, Apple has asked the Court to take judicial notice of the following: 
(1) the English-language  portions  of  Apple’s  Software  License  Agreements,  iPad,  iPhone, and 
iPod touch Terms and Conditions for iOS 4.1, 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, and 7.0 software; (2) a document 
entitled “Apple  Answers  the  FCC’s  Questions”;;  (3)  Apple’s  Customer  Privacy  Policy;;  (4)  Apple’s  
iOS  Human  Interface  Guidelines;;  (5)  Apple’s  App  Store  Approval  Process  instructions for 
developers; (6) the complaint in Apple Inc. v. Paul S. Devine, No. 10-cv-03563 EJD; and (7) the 
civil docket for Case No. 10-cv-03563 EJD.  ECF Nos. 502, 516.  Plaintiffs have not objected to 
Apple’s  requests. 
The Court may take judicial notice of facts  that  are  “not  subject  to  reasonable  dispute”  
because  they  are  either  “generally  known  within  the  trial  court’s  territorial  jurisdiction”  or  “can  be  
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 201.   
The Court will take judicial notice of the Software License Agreements, Privacy Policy, 
iOS  Human  Interface  Guidelines,  and  Apple’s  App  Store  Approval  Process  instructions,  as they 
are publicly available, standard documents that are capable of ready and accurate determination, 
and  they  are  relevant  to  Plaintiffs’  UCL  and  FAL  claims.  See Datel Holdings, Ltd. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983-84 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (taking judicial notice of an Xbox software 
license, terms of use, and packaging); McMahon v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. 
EDCV 13-02032-VAP (SPx), 2014 WL324008, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (citation omitted).  
Moreover, the SCAC references the License Agreements, Privacy Policy, Human Interface 
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Guidelines, and  “Apple  Answers  the  FCC’s  Questions,”  and for that independent reason, those 
documents are judicially noticeable.  See id. at 983; In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., --- F. 
Supp. 2d ---, 2014 WL 4379916, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014) (taking judicial notice of 
Adobe’s  terms  of  use  and  privacy  policies, which were incorporated by reference into the 
complaint).  The Court takes judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  these  documents  exist,  “not  whether,  
for  example,  the  documents  are  valid  or  binding  contracts.”    Datel, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 984.  And 
with  respect  to  the  document  entitled  “Apple  Answers  the  FCC’s  Questions,”  the  Court  will  take  
notice that the document was in the public realm at the relevant time, but not take notice of the 
truth of the facts in that document.  McMahon, 2014 WL324008, at *2 (citation omitted).  
The Court also will take judicial notice of the two court documents, as they are matters of 
public record, which are generally subject to notice.  Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 
(9th Cir. 2001).  
B. Misrepresentation Claims 
Apple  seeks  to  dismiss  Plaintiffs’  fraud-based4 FAL, CLRA, deceit, and UCL claims on 
several grounds.  First, Apple argues that Plaintiffs, in their SCAC, fail to plead reliance on any 
particular representation by Apple.  ECF No. 501 at 7.  Second, Apple contends that its alleged 
misrepresentations  are  not  sufficiently  alleged  to  have  been  part  of  “an  extensive  and  long-term 
advertising  campaign,”  In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 328 (2009), such that Plaintiffs 
should be excused from pleading reliance.  Id. at 8.   
With regard to the first point, Apple contends that Plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead 
reliance because the named Plaintiffs have not identified which alleged misrepresentations they 
viewed, heard, or read, and therefore which they relied on in purchasing their iDevices.  ECF No. 
501 at 7-8.  Plaintiffs effectively concede this point.  See ECF No. 509 at 3.  Plaintiffs respond, 
however, that they have sufficiently alleged a Tobacco II-type extensive and long-term advertising 
                                                 
4 The Court has previously construed these claims as fraud-based, with the exception of any UCL 
claims not grounded in fraud.  See ECF No. 471 at 23 n.13.  Plaintiffs have not challenged this 
construction, and the Court sees no reason to revisit it.  Accordingly, these claims are subject to 
Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  9(b)’s  heightened pleading standard. 
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campaign, such that they should be excused from pleading reliance.  Id. at 3-10.   
In Tobacco II, the California Supreme Court held that, while a plaintiff alleging a UCL 
claim  “must  plead  and  prove  actual  reliance,”  the  plaintiff  “is  not  required  to  necessarily  plead and 
prove individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations or false statements where, as here, 
those misrepresentations and false statements were part of an extensive and long-term advertising 
campaign.”  46 Cal. 4th at 328.  Thus, a  plaintiff  may  plead  “an  extensive  and  long-term 
advertising  campaign,”  rather  than  pleading  reliance  on  specific  misrepresentations. 
In its order on the previous motions to dismiss in this case, the Court identified six factors 
from the prior case law that bear on whether a plaintiff has pleaded an advertising campaign in 
accordance with Tobacco II.  ECF No. 471 at 27-31.  First, a plaintiff must allege that she actually 
saw or heard the defendant’s  advertising  campaign.    Second, the advertising campaign must be 
sufficiently lengthy in duration, and widespread in dissemination, that it would be unrealistic to 
require the plaintiff to plead each misrepresentation she saw and relied upon.  Third, the plaintiff 
must describe in the complaint, and preferably attach to it, a representative sample of the 
advertisements at issue so as to adequately notify the defendant of the precise nature of the 
misrepresentation claim—what, in particular, defendant is alleged to have said, and how it was 
misleading.  Fourth, the plaintiff must allege, and the court must evaluate, the degree to which the 
alleged misrepresentations contained within the advertising campaign are similar to each other.  
Fifth, each plaintiff must plead with particularity, and separately, when and how they were 
exposed to the advertising campaign, so as to ensure the advertisements were representations 
consumers were likely to have viewed, rather than representations that were isolated or more 
narrowly disseminated.  And finally, sixth, the court must be able to determine when a plaintiff 
made his or her purchase or otherwise relied on  defendant’s  advertising  campaign,  so  as  to  
determine which portion of that campaign is relevant.  Id.   
Apple  argues  that  Plaintiffs’  allegations  do  not  satisfy  Tobacco II.  It first argues that 
Tobacco II did not relax the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), so Plaintiffs must still 
identify the representations on which they relied.  ECF No. 501 at 8.  Next, Apple contends that 
Plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead a long-term  advertising  campaign  and  have  “plainly  
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flunk[ed] the six-factor  test  set  out  in  this  Court’s  [prior]  MTD  order.”5  ECF No. 501 at 9. 
 
1. The Relationship Between Tobacco II and Rule 9(b) 
As a preliminary matter, Apple argues that Plaintiffs must still identify the specific 
advertisements they saw and relied on, notwithstanding the holding in Tobacco II.  According to 
Apple, Tobacco II held  that  “reliance  need  not  be  proved through exposure to particular 
advertisements; [but that] the case does not stand for, nor could it, a general relaxation of the 
pleading requirements under  Rule  9(b).”    ECF  No.  501  at  8 (quoting In re iPhone 4S Consumer 
Litig., No. C 12-1127 CW, 2013 WL 3829653, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013)) (emphasis added 
by Apple).  A number of district courts within the Ninth Circuit have reached similar conclusions.  
See Herrington v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., No. C 09-1597 CW, 2010 WL 
3448531, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010); In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., No. C 08-02376 MHP, 
2009 WL 3740648, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Garcia v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., LLC, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re 
WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR Rates Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2011); 
Goldsmith v. Allergan, Inc., No. CV 09-7088 PSG EX, 2011 WL 2909313, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 
25, 2011); Germain v. J.C. Penney Co., No. CV 09-2847CAS(FMOX), 2009 WL 1971336, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. July 6, 2009); Stanwood v. Mary Kay, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1219-20 (C.D. Cal. 
2012).   
This Court, however, has previously reached the opposite conclusion.  Haskins v. 
Symantec Corp., No. 13-CV-01834-JST, 2013 WL 6234610 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).6  It 
concluded that once a plaintiff sufficiently alleges exposure to a long-term advertising campaign 
as set forth in Tobacco II, she did not need to plead specific reliance on an individual 
                                                 
5 Apple acknowledges that Tobacco II only permitted the reliance-pleading alternative with 
respect  to  UCL  and  FAL  claims,  not  Plaintiffs’  other  misrepresentation  claims.    ECF  No.  501  at  8  
(“Plaintiffs  seek  to  avoid  reliance  pleading requirements for at least their UCL and FAL claims by 
attempting  to  alleged  a  ‘long-term advertising campaign’ within the meaning of In re Tobacco 
II.”)  (emphasis  added).    But  Apple  has  not  challenged  the  applicability  of  Tobacco II to  Plaintiffs’  
other misrepresentation claims.  See id.  Thus, the Court addresses Tobacco II without 
differentiating between those claims. 
 
6 In their Opposition, Plaintiffs incorrectly cite a different Haskins order.  ECF No. 509 at 3.   
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representation.    The  Court’s  reasons  for  reaching that conclusion were as follows: 
 
It is very difficult to reconcile [federal case law requiring pleading 
fraud with particularity] with Tobacco II.  If Plaintiff can prevail at 
trial without demonstrating that she saw any specific advertisement, 
it would make little sense to interpret Rule 9(b) to require dismissal 
of her claim at the pleading stage for failing to include a specific 
allegation that she saw a specific advertisement.  The Court does not 
read [prior case law] as quietly establishing that Rule 9(b) requires a 
plaintiff to plead specific facts regarding the viewing of a specific 
advertisement even when a plaintiff need not prove that fact to 
prevail under the underlying substantive law.  If interpreted in this 
manner, Rule 9(b) would become more substantive than procedural, 
since  it  would  “abridge”  or  “modify”  a  “substantive  right”  granted  
to plaintiffs under the UCL and CLRA.   
Id. at *5.   
The Court still believes this conclusion to be the correct one.  The holding of Tobacco II 
was  substantive,  not  procedural:    “a  plaintiff  .  .  .  is not required to necessarily plead and prove 
individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations or false statements where, as here, those 
misrepresentations and false statements were part of an extensive and long-term advertising 
campaign.”    46  Cal.  4th  at  328  (emphases  added).    To  require  Plaintiffs  now  to  plead  their  claims  
more particularly than they are required to prove them at trial would abridge and modify their 
substantive legal rights.  If a plaintiff sufficiently alleges exposure to a long-term advertising 
campaign as set forth in Tobacco II, she need not plead specific reliance on an individual 
representation.   
 
2. Application of the Six-Factor Tobacco II Test 
The Court next turns to the six factors it previously identified as most significant to the 
Tobacco II analysis.   
 
a. Allegations  that  Plaintiffs  actually  saw  or  heard  Apple’s  
advertising campaign 
As to the first Tobacco II factor, Apple argues that Plaintiffs have alleged no facts in 
support  of  their  allegation  that  they  were  “exposed”  to  its  alleged  advertising  campaign.    ECF No. 
501 at 9.  Apple also states that, to the extent Plaintiffs have alleged facts regarding their exposure 
to particular advertisements, those advertisements are not specific to the subject of Plaintiffs’  
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claims.7  Id.  Plaintiffs  respond  that  they  have  alleged  that  they  actually  saw  Apple’s  advertising  
campaign  in  “granular  detail.”    ECF  No.  509  at  4  (citing  SCAC,  ECF  No.  478,  ¶¶  144,  150,  156,  
163, 170, 176, 182, 187, 193, 199, 205, 212, 218, 225, 232). 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the individual named Plaintiffs 
saw or heard  Apple’s  advertising  campaign.    Each  set  of  allegations  specific  to  individual  
Plaintiffs alleges, among other things, that  he  or  she  viewed,  heard,  or  read  Apple’s  
advertisements, or statements in news reports, articles, blogs, and/or statements by Apple’s  former  
CEO, Stephen Jobs; attended Apple conferences, presentations or product-release events; and/or 
received emails or other communications from  Apple  touting  its  devices’  security  and/or  its  
respect  for  its  customers’  privacy.  See, e.g., ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 144, 170.  These allegations 
significantly  improve  upon  the  single  and  bare  allegation  that  “Plaintiffs  ‘viewed  Apple’s  website,  
saw in-store  advertisements,  and/or  [were]  aware  of  Apple’s  representations  regarding  the  safety  
and security of the iDevices  prior  to  purchasing  their  own  iDevices.’”    ECF  No.  471  at  33  (citing  
CAC, ¶ 126).  The pleading stage is not summary judgment; to the extent that allegations 
regarding individual Plaintiffs’ exposure  to  Apple’s  advertising  campaign  are  sparse, they can be 
tested after discovery allows the parties further factual development.  See, e.g., id., ¶ 176. 
The SCAC satisfies the first Tobacco II factor. 
 
b. The advertising campaign is sufficiently lengthy in duration, and 
widespread in dissemination, that it would be unrealistic to 
require Plaintiffs to plead each misrepresentation they saw and 
relied on 
Plaintiffs have alleged  that  the  relevant  portion  of  Apple’s  advertising  campaign  lasted 
“from  before  the  time  the  iPhone  was  first  announced  in  2007  continuing through the present 
day.”  ECF No. 509 at 6.  Thus, the relevant period for purposes of this motion is approximately 
five years—from before the iPhone was first announced in 2007 until the end of the class period in 
February 2012.  Apple contends that this duration is insufficient under Tobacco II.  ECF No. 501 
at 9 (citing Haskins v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-cv-01834-JST, 2014 WL 2450996, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. June 2, 2014), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 182 Cal. App. 4th 622, 633-34 (2010)). 
                                                 
7 The Court addresses this issue in section IV.B.2.g., infra. 
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Plaintiffs point out that where courts have found that media campaigns are more targeted 
or extensive, shorter periods of time—even as short as nine months—have been considered  “long-
term.”  ECF No. 509 at 6-7 (citing Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-0940-GPC-WVG, 
2014 WL 688164, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014), and Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 
177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1245-46, 1258 (2009)).  Further, Plaintiffs contend that, given the short 
lifespans of technological products, a bright-line rule requiring that an advertising campaign span 
more than five years would  “essentially  immunize  much  of  the  tech  industry  from  Tobacco II 
claims  .  .  .  .”    Id. at 7. 
The Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the five-year duration of the alleged 
advertising campaign is insufficient for the purposes of Tobacco II.  While the alleged campaign 
certainly is shorter than the “decades-long”  campaign  analyzed in Tobacco II, as Plaintiffs have 
pointed out, at least one court has also held that the  “long-term” requirement is met by a shorter 
timeframe.8  See Morgan,  177  Cal.  App.  4th  at  1258  (“Although  the  advertising  campaign  alleged  
in this case was not as long-term  a  campaign  as  the  tobacco  companies’  campaign  discussed  in  
Tobacco II, it is alleged to have taken place over [eighteen] months, in several different 
media . . . .”). 
Apple  also  argues  that  Plaintiffs  have  failed  to  allege  that  Apple’s  advertising  campaign  
was  sufficiently  “extensive” because Plaintiffs have only specifically identified a handful of 
advertisements per year during the relevant period.  ECF No. 501 at 10-11. 
But,  as  Plaintiffs  point  out,  the  identified  advertisements  are  merely  “examples,  .  .  .  and  are  
incomplete.”    ECF  No.  509  at  7.    Plaintiffs  identify dozens of specific examples of what they 
believe represents the advertising campaign, and those examples span eighteen pages of the SCAC 
(not including the numerous examples attached to the complaint, ECF No. 478, Exs. A-CC).  
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these examples demonstrate an 
“extensive”  campaign.    See ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 61-78. 
Plaintiffs’  allegations  satisfy  this  Tobacco II factor. 
                                                 
8 Plaintiffs cite Makaeff, but as Apple notes, Makaeff was a class-certification decision, so its 
discussion of Tobacco II is not directly on point here.  See 2014 WL 688164, at *13. 
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c. Plaintiffs must describe in the complaint, and preferably attach 
to it, a representative sample of the advertisements at issue 
As described in the preceding section, Plaintiffs have extensively described, and attached 
representative samples of, the advertisements at issue.   
Apple argues that the advertisements and marketing materials that Plaintiffs have identified 
are not actionable because many of the identified materials: (1) are too general, (2) are not 
relevant, (3) are not contained in the types of materials that consumers are likely to view, and 
(4) cannot be attributed to Apple.  ECF No. 501 at 11-14. 
As to generality, Apple makes two arguments.  First, Apple contends that many of the 
alleged  advertisements  only  generally  discuss  the  “security”  of  Apple  iDevices  and  protections  for  
consumers’  “privacy.”   The Court addresses this argument in section IV.B.2.g., infra.  Second, 
Apple argues that some of the identified advertisements are too general to  support  a  “specific  and  
measurable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement 
of  objective  fact.”  ECF No. 501 at 11-12 (quoting Rasmussen v. Apple, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 
2014 WL 1047091, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014), and citing Minkler v. Apple, Inc., --- F. Supp. 
2d ---, 2014 WL 4100613, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014)).  But both cases Apple cites for this 
proposition are inapposite; in neither case did Plaintiffs invoke Tobacco II, and in both 
circumstances, the Plaintiffs were therefore instead required to identify, in their pleadings, specific 
misrepresentations on which they relied.  Further, while Plaintiffs do cite a number of general 
statements  regarding  “security”  and  “privacy,”  they  also  cite  more  specific  statements  regarding 
sandboxing and consumer-data protection.  See, e.g., ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 76(ix)  (“Apple  issued  a  
statement  that  it  was  ‘readying  a  software  update  to  the  iPhone,  fixing  a  security  flaw  in  the  device  
that gives unauthorized access to contacts and e-mails.’”),  76(xxi)  (“Apps  cannot  transmit  data  
about a user without obtaining  the  user’s  prior  permission  and  providing  the  user  with  access  to  
information  about  how  and  where  the  data  will  be  used.”)  (emphasis  omitted),  77(ii)  
(“Applications  on  the  device  are  ‘sandboxed’  so  they  cannot  access  data  stored  by  other  
applications.”) (emphasis omitted).  These statements are capable of being proven false, and 
therefore the above-cited cases do  not  defeat  Plaintiffs’  Tobacco II allegations. 
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Apple also argues that certain elements of the alleged advertising campaign that Plaintiffs 
rely on are not relevant because they were either alleged prior to (though in anticipation of) the 
App  Store’s  launch  or  were  directed  to  corporate  networks  and  device  passcodes.  ECF No. 501 at 
12-13.   
As an initial matter, the Court finds that elements of Apple’s  alleged  marketing  campaign  
that pre-dated the launch of the App Store, but anticipated that impending launch, are relevant to 
Plaintiffs’  Tobacco II allegations.  Statements and advertising concerning corporate security 
networks and device passwords, however, are not the most probative examples of the alleged 
advertising campaign.  They do, however, provide context for the more general campaign and tend 
to show the consistency of the message that Apple allegedly intended to convey—i.e.,  that  Apple’s  
iDevices  are  “secure”  and  include  comprehensive consumer-privacy protections. 
Apple also explains that consumers  are  not  likely  to  view  or  be  aware  of  Apple’s licensing 
agreements with App developers, which Plaintiffs have identified as part of the alleged advertising 
campaign.  Plaintiffs argue, generally, that statements in the licensing agreements, guidelines, and 
those  directed  to  at  least  purportedly  limited  audiences  have  a  cumulative  effect  on  “buzz”  or  
“earned  media.”    ECF  No.  509  at  9.     
Apple’s  point in this regard is well-taken.  Without having indicated why consumers would 
be  aware  of  Apple’s  licensing  agreements  with  App  developers—and having elsewhere suggested 
that Apple intended the information in those agreements to remain private—the Court finds that 
Apple’s  representations  in  licensing  agreements  should  not  be  counted  as  part  of  the  overall  
advertising campaign. 
Finally, Apple claims that representations made by third parties in the media are not 
properly attributable to the alleged advertising campaign.  But to the extent Apple commissioned 
these messages or took advantage of the opportunity to put its message into the media, these 
statements can be attributed to Apple for the purposes of Tobacco II.  Further, Plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged  and  further  explained  that  many  of  these  messages  are  examples  of  “buzz  
marketing”  or  “earned  media,”  whereby  Apple  “capitalized  on  its  ubiquitous  presence  and  the  
immense  public  attention  given  anything  Apple  does”  to  spread  its  messages  by  the  “eagerly 
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follow[ing]  .  .  .  media  and  the  public.”      ECF  No.  478,  ¶¶  3,  62-66.  Plaintiffs even allege that 
Apple  employed  a  “Worldwide  Global  Director  of  Buzz  Marketing”  to  take  advantage  of  this  type  
of media, which is largely spread by third parties.  Id., ¶ 63.  At the very least, even purely third-
party messages are circumstantial  evidence  of  Apple’s  advertising  campaign;;  without  such  a  
campaign, the messages are less likely to be picked up and expressed by third parties.  The third-
party documents Plaintiffs have identified as part of the Tobacco II campaign are sufficiently 
probative to be counted as part of the alleged campaign.  The  precise  relationship  between  Apple’s  
“buzz  marketing”  and  third  party  advertisements  is  a  subject  better  left  for  summary  judgment or 
trial.   
Even excising the materials as to which Apple’s  objections  are  well-taken, the SCAC 
contains ample discussion of advertisements, marketing materials, and equivalent activity to 
satisfy this Tobacco II factor. 
 
d. The degree to which the alleged misrepresentations contained 
within the advertising campaign are similar to each other 
Apple argues that the materials Plaintiffs have identified as constituting the Tobacco II 
campaign  are  too  dissimilar:  “Plaintiffs  fail  to  allege  a  ‘single  set  of messages. . . . [The] SAC-
alleged statements address security or privacy in a wide range of contexts—including corporate 
network applications, App Store transactions, device passcodes, storage, location data, and 
others.”    ECF  No.  501  at  14.    Apple’s  main contention is that the portions of the alleged 
advertising campaign that Plaintiffs have identified largely do not pertain specifically to address 
book data.  Id. at 14-15.  Plaintiffs  respond  that,  “[a]s  set  forth  in  the  SCAC,  Apple’s  statements  
about security and privacy in all aspects of its iDevices constitute characteristics that, if false, [are] 
actionable under Tobacco II.”  ECF No. 509 at 10. 
The Court finds that, despite being directed to different audiences and being of varying 
degrees of specificity, the materials that Plaintiffs have identified are sufficiently similar for the 
purposes of Tobacco II.    All  of  the  statements  relate  to  Apple’s  concern  for  its  devices’  security,  
and  its  customers’  privacy, and thus they send a unified and consistent message.  To the extent that 
Apple challenges the generality of certain statements, that concern is addressed in section 
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IV.B.2.g, infra. 
 
e. Each Plaintiff must plead with particularity, and separately, 
when and how they were exposed to the advertising campaign 
As discussed in section IV.B.2.a., supra, with respect to the first Tobacco II factor, 
Plaintiffs have particularly and separately pleaded how they were exposed to the alleged 
advertising campaign.  The Court must also address  the  “when”  allegations. 
Most Plaintiffs allege that they viewed the alleged advertising campaign “prior to” their 
purchase of their iDevices.  ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 144(ii), 150(ii), 156(ii), 163(ii), 170(ii), 182(ii), 
187(ii), 193(ii), 199(ii), 205(v), 212(ii), 218, 225(ii), 232(ii).  They do not allege specific dates, or 
even timeframes, during which they were exposed to the campaign.  See id.  This failure weighs 
against  a  finding  that  Plaintiffs’  allegations  are  sufficient  under Tobacco II. 
On the other hand, the majority of Plaintiffs have averred that they viewed the alleged 
campaign prior to their purchase of their iDevices.  The exact dates of viewing are less relevant 
than is the fact that Plaintiffs viewed the campaign before they purchased their iDevices—the 
implication being that they, therefore, relied on the campaign in choosing their purchases.   
Except as to Plaintiff Jason Green, who has not  alleged  any  “when,” the  gaps  in  Plaintiffs’  
“when”  allegations  are  not  fatal  to  Plaintiffs’  Tobacco II claims.    Instead,  individual  Plaintiffs’  
exposure  to  Apple’s  campaign  can  be  tested  after  discovery  permits further factual development. 
 
f. When Plaintiffs purchased their iDevices or otherwise relied on 
Apple’s advertising campaign 
Apple does not argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet this factor.  Each Plaintiff has 
alleged a timeframe in which he or she purchased one or more iDevices.  See ECF No. 471, ¶¶ 
139, 145, 151, 157, 158, 164, 165, 171, 177, 183, 188, 189, 194, 200, 206, 207, 213, 219, 220, 
226, 227. 
Plaintiffs have satisfied this Tobacco II factor. 
 
g. The specificity required of the advertising campaign vis-à-vis 
Plaintiffs’  misrepresentation  allegations 
Apple raises a seventh and final concern, namely: how specifically must the campaign 
address the particular characteristics of the product that Plaintiffs allege were misrepresented?  
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Here,  the  question  is  whether  the  statements  Plaintiffs  point  to  that  generally  tout  the  iDevices’  
“security”  and  Apple’s  emphasis  on  consumer “privacy”  are  sufficient evidence—in conjunction 
with the advertisements and marketing materials Plaintiffs have pointed to that specifically 
identify protections for address book data  or  “sandboxing”—to show that Apple engaged in a 
Tobacco II campaign advertising that Apple protected, in particular, Plaintiffs’  address  book  data.     
Plaintiffs’  response  to  this  concern  is  to  point  out  that  “[n]othing  in  the  Court’s  prior  order,  
Tobacco II, or any relevant case law immunizes Apple from the effect of a misleading advertising 
campaign touting the  ‘safety  and  reliability’  of  its  product  because  its  statements  may  not  have  
uniformly  specified  safety  from  ‘address  book  data  .  .  .  collected  and  used  by  third  party  
applications.’”  ECF No. 509 at 5.  Further, say Plaintiffs, Apple’s  contention  that  the  advertising  
campaign must be specific to the protection of address book data is “like saying the tobacco 
companies  were  immunized  from  their  statements  about  the  ‘safety  and  health  effects’  of  smoking  
because their statements did not  uniformly  specify  safety  ‘from  tar  and  chemical  additive  intake  in  
the  development  of  lung  cancer’  or  specify  the  effect  ‘from  nicotine  intake  in  the  development  of  
addiction.’”    Id.   
Plaintiffs’  comparison  to the generality of the advertising campaign alleged in Tobacco II 
is well-taken.  The Court finds that the fifteen or twenty more-specific statements about 
sandboxing, protection of personal information, and consumer privacy Plaintiffs have identified, 
combined with the larger and more general campaign expressing Apple’s  concern  with  privacy  
and security, are sufficiently related to the alleged failing of the iDevices to satisfy Tobacco II’s  
pleading requirements. 
Plaintiffs’  Tobacco II allegations, taken as a whole, are sufficient to survive Apple’s  
motion to dismiss. 
C. Apple’s  Alleged  Omissions 
In  addition  to  Plaintiffs’  claims  regarding  Apple’s  alleged  affirmative  misrepresentations,  
they  also  allege  that  Apple  knew,  but  failed  to  disclose  (and  actively  concealed),  that  users’  private  
data  was  not  secure  on  Apple’s  iDevices.     
As  this  Court  noted  in  its  previous  order,  “the  Ninth  Circuit  has  recently  cautioned  [that],  
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in the context of product defect claims, California courts have generally rejected a broad 
obligation to  disclose.”    Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citing Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Omission or concealment constitute actionable fraud in three circumstances that are 
relevant here: when defendants (1) had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to 
plaintiffs; (2) actively concealed a material fact from plaintiffs; or (3) made partial representations, 
but also suppressed some material facts.  LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 336 (1997).  
Further,  “[a]  manufacturer’s  duty  to  consumers  is  limited  to  its  warranty  obligations  absent  either  
an  affirmative  misrepresentation  or  a  safety  issue.”    Donohue, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (quoting 
Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp.,  322  Fed.  App’x  489,  493  (9th  Cir.  2009)).  The Court now 
examines whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged such circumstances.   
a. Apple’s  exclusive  knowledge  of  material  facts 
Plaintiffs allege that Apple had exclusive knowledge of material facts regarding its 
iDevices’  lack of security, as evidenced by: (1) security breaches involving Path, Inc., the Aurora 
Feint App, and the Google Voice App; (2) information developed at congressional hearings and 
before the FTC; (3) its software upgrades in response to specific, identified software 
vulnerabilities; (4) Apple’s  removal  from  the  App  Store  of  an  App  designed  to  alert  users  to  other  
Apps’  stealing  of  user  data;;  and  (5)  Apple’s  punishment of a privacy researcher, Charlie Miller, 
who  “intentionally  passed  a  non-compliant  App  through  Apple’s  review  and  onto  the  App  Store  in  
a proof-of-concept security test and reported to Apple the gaping security hole that he found in 
Apple’s  App  procedures.”  ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 79-89. 
Apple  contends  that  Plaintiffs’  allegations  regarding  Apple’s  exclusive  knowledge  of  
material facts are inconsistent with Plaintiffs’  other  allegations regarding the widespread 
dissemination of information about Apple in the media, and the discussion in the media of the 
security  flaws  in  Apple’s  iDevices.    ECF  No.  501  at  18;;  ECF  No.  515  at  10. 
Plaintiffs respond that although the media discussed isolated security breaches, Apple 
effected  a  campaign  to  “drown  out”  reports  of  those  breaches,  and Plaintiffs never had knowledge, 
unlike  Apple,  “that  this  address  book-related flaw was an inherent defect in the iDevices (as 
Case3:13-cv-00453-JST   Document543   Filed03/23/15   Page19 of 34
 20 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tri
ct
 C
ou
rt 
N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
opposed to an itinerant instance of hacking), much less that Apple was aiding App Defendants and 
teaching and permitting them to  exploit  the  defect.”    Id.  Further, Plaintiffs point to their 
allegations  that  Apple  took  “affirmative  steps  to  discourage  or  even  disable  people’s  attempts  to  
determine  whether  their  Contacts  were  being  stolen  so  as  to  hide  the  true  facts.”    Id. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Apple had exclusive 
knowledge of at least the material fact that its iDevices contained an inherent defect that permitted 
Apps  to  access  users’  address  book  data.       
b. Active concealment 
Plaintiffs allege  as  active  concealment  the  same  facts  in  support  of  their  claims  of  Apple’s  
exclusive knowledge of material facts.  See ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 79-89.  Apple contends that Plaintiffs 
have failed to allege active concealment adequately because  Apple’s  Privacy  Policy disclosed that 
third  parties,  including  those  who  offer  Apps,  may  collect  information  such  as  “data  or  contact  
details.”    ECF  No.  501  at  17-18; ECF No. 515 at 9-10.  Thus, argues Apple, “[b]ecause  Apple  
disclosed precisely the information that Plaintiffs say was omitted, the omissions claims must be 
dismissed.”    ECF  No.  501  at  17  (citations  omitted). 
Apple’s  argument  does  not  foreclose  Plaintiffs’  allegations  of  active  concealment.  
Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that Apple disclosed some of the risks associated with its 
iDevices, they also allege that Apple failed to disclose all the material facts, and that Apple falsely 
reassured consumers that its iDevices did not contain security vulnerabilities that Apple knew they 
contained.  See ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 87, 88.  Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Apple did not disclose 
that it taught  or  encouraged  the  App  Defendants  to  access  users’  information  via  the  Human  
Interface Guidelines.  See id., ¶ 89.  At this stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiffs’  allegations  of  active  concealment  are legally adequate. 
c. Partial representations triggering a duty to disclose 
Under  California  law,  the  “failure  to  disclose  a  fact  can  constitute  actionable  fraud  .  .  .  
when the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because some other material 
fact  has  not  been  disclosed.”    Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 255-56 (2011) 
(citations omitted).   
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Plaintiffs allege partial disclosures in the form of: Apple’s  (1) alleged advertising 
campaign; (2) public acknowledgment of security breaches involving Path, Inc., the Aurora Feint 
App, and the Google Voice App; (3) statements at congressional hearings and to the FTC; and (4) 
software upgrades in response to identified software vulnerabilities.9  ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 76-77, 79-
86, 289.  Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that while Apple addressed specific security breaches in 
public, discussed some security concerns at congressional hearings and before the FTC, and 
released software upgrades in response to identified security breaches, Apple failed ever to reveal 
the  extent  to  which  Apps  could  and  did  access  information  in  iDevices’  Contacts  App. 
The Court finds  that  Plaintiffs’  partial-disclosure allegations are insufficient.  Plaintiffs 
have not alleged that class members saw or heard these partial representations and were misled by 
them in such a way that Apple should have fully disclosed related information.  A partial-
representation claim requires Plaintiffs to plead reliance on at least some misleading partial 
representations.   See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
Because Plaintiffs have failed to plead that they saw, heard, or relied on such misrepresentations, 
Plaintiffs’  partial-representation theory fails. 
d. Warranty allegations 
“A  manufacturer’s  duty  to  consumers  is  limited  to  its  warranty obligations absent either an 
affirmative  misrepresentation  or  a  safety  issue.”    Donohue, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (citation 
omitted).  The Court, in its  prior  order  on  Defendants’  prior  motions  to  dismiss,  explained  that, 
because  Plaintiffs  had  failed  “to  allege  when  they  purchased  their  iDevices,  when  the  alleged  
defects arose, what kind of warranty Apple provided, the terms of the warranty, and the warranty’s  
duration,”  the  Court  was  “unable  to  conclude  whether  the  alleged  defect  manifested  within  the  
warranty  period”  and  thus  Plaintiffs’  claims  were  inadequate.    ECF  No.  471  at  34. 
In  the  SCAC,  Plaintiffs’  warranty  allegations  are  contained  in  two  paragraphs, which state: 
                                                 
9 In its motion, Apple does not contest that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a partial representation 
triggering a duty to disclose.  See ECF No. 501 at 16-18.  Only in its reply does Apple challenge 
Plaintiffs’  partial-representation allegations.  See ECF No. 515 at 10-11.  The Court will not 
address  Apple’s  arguments  because  they  were  raised  for  the  first  time in reply.  See Pirozzi, 966 F. 
Supp. 2d at 918 n.3 (citations omitted).  
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“iDevices  come  with  a  written  limited  warranty  with  a  warranty  period  of  one  year  from  the  date  
of  purchase.    Additional  extended  warranties  were  not  available  for  purchase,”  ECF  No.  478,  ¶  38,  
and  “[the]  deficiencies  in  the  iDevices . . . were inherent in the products and existed at the time of 
purchase and at all times thereafter.  Though the iDevices are covered by a limited one-year 
warranty, the deficiencies at issue were present from the outset, and therefore arose and 
manifested  within  the  warranty  period,”  id., ¶ 291. 
Apple points  to  the  obvious  defect  in  Plaintiffs’  allegations—i.e., that Plaintiffs have again 
failed to identify the warranty terms applicable to their allegations.  Without those warranty terms, 
the Court cannot assess  whether  the  alleged  security  defects  in  Apple’s  iDevices  somehow  
contravene those terms.   
Accordingly, though Plaintiffs have identified some potentially actionable omissions, they 
have failed to identify any relevant warranty obligations.  For that  reason,  Plaintiffs’  omissions  
theories fail.10 
B. Aiding and Abetting Liability 
1. Adequacy of Allegations of Aiding and Abetting 
To adequately plead aiding and abetting liability under California law, Plaintiffs must 
allege that Apple (1) knew the App Defendants’  conduct  constituted  a  breach  of  duty  and  gave  
substantial assistance or encouragement to the App Defendants to so act, or (2) gave substantial 
assistance to the App Defendants in accomplishing either conversion or invasion of privacy, and 
Apple’s  own  conduct, separately considered, constituted a breach of the duty to Plaintiffs.  Casey 
v.  U.S.  Bank  Nat’l  Ass’n, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1144 (2005) (citations omitted); In re First 
Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Casey); Laborers’  Local  v.  Intersil, 
868 F. Supp. 2d 838, 850 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
Apple  contends  that  Plaintiffs  have  failed  to  allege  Apple’s  knowledge  of  the  App  
Defendants’  tortious  conduct.    ECF  No.  501  at  18-20; ECF No. 515 at 11-13.  Plaintiffs point to 
                                                 
10 Plaintiffs  do  not  allege  Apple’s  omissions  as  part  of  a  separate  cause  of  action.   They include 
them  in  the  same  causes  of  action  with  allegations  regarding  Apple’s  alleged  affirmative  
misrepresentations.   
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their allegations that the  “iOS  Human  Interface  Guidelines  expressly  teach  and  tell  App  
Defendants  to  take  contacts  data  without  seeking  permission,”  that Apple  is  “responsible  for  
creating the harmful APIs11 that  allowed  app  access  to  users’  address books . . . and expressly 
served as agent for each app on myriad commercial matters,” and that “Apple’s  reach  extends  
deep  into  every  aspect  in  the  life  of  each  app  and  over  the  entire  iDevice  consumer  ecosystem.”    
ECF No. 509 at 15-16. 
As an initial matter, the Court notes that, even for fraud-based claims, which are subject to 
the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard, scienter allegations may be pleaded generally.  Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions  of  a  person’s  mind  may  be  
alleged generally.”).    Plaintiffs’  complaint  does  this.  See ECF No. 478, ¶¶ 250, 266 (“Despite its 
ostensible policies against  the  collection  of  iDevice  users’  private  information  .  .  .,  Apple  in  fact  .  .  
. knowingly and/or recklessly  permitted  the  unauthorized  access  and  collection  of  Plaintiffs’  and  
class  members’  private  address  books.”). 
Further, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts from which an inference of knowledge can 
be drawn—most particularly the language in the iOS Human Interface Guidelines and  Apple’s  
alleged development of APIs that permitted Apps to access address book data, but also because of 
the extent to which Plaintiffs allege Apple was involved in and controlled the development and 
functions of Apps offered through its App Store.  See id., ¶¶ 39, 43-53.  It is true, as Apple points 
out, that even the SCAC acknowledges that Apple, at times, withdrew Apps from its App Store 
that it discovered were accessing consumer data without consent.  See ECF No. 501 at 28 n.21 
(citing SCAC, ECF No. 478, ¶ 140, among others).  But these contrary factual allegations merely 
point to the need for further factual development of this issue. 
2. Communications Decency Act 
Apple  seeks  to  dismiss  Plaintiffs’  invasion  of  privacy  and  conversion  claims  on  the  basis  
                                                 
11 “API”  stands  for  “application  program  interface”  and  means:  “A  language  and  message  format  
used by an application program to communicate with the operating system or some other control 
program  such  as  a  database  management  system  (DBMS)  or  communications  protocol.”    
Encyclopedia. Definition of: API, PC Magazine (January 9, 2015), 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/37856/api. 
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that  the  Communications  Decency  Act  (“CDA”),  47  U.S.C.  §  230,  bars  those  claims.     
In  its  previous  order  granting  in  part  Apple’s  motion  to  dismiss  the CAC, the Court 
rejected the same argument.  See ECF No. 471 at 18-23.  Apple contends that the Court should 
take a fresh look at the CDA because the factual allegations in the SCAC differ from those in the 
CAC,  and  “there  have  been  relevant  developments  in  the  fast-changing law concerning the CDA.”    
ECF No. 501 at 24 n.18 (citing Jones  v.  Dirty  World  Entm’t  Recordings,  LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 2014)).   
The Court has read the SCAC and Jones.  The SCAC’s  allegations  have  not  materially  
changed with regard to whether Apple  is  an  “information  content  provider”  not  subject  to  CDA  
protection, and Apple does not explain how the allegations of the SCAC are different from those 
of the CAC in a way that helps Apple.  In fact, Apple still relies on allegations from the now-
superseded CAC to make its arguments.  See ECF No. 501 at 27-28.  It also spills a great deal of 
ink analyzing Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1168 
(9th Cir. 2008), which was the centerpiece of its prior motion to dismiss.  ECF No. 501 at 25-29.  
Though  dressed  up  in  “fresh  look”  language,  this  portion  of  the  motion  reads  more  like a belated 
motion for reconsideration.   
Jones,  the  one  new  case  cited  by  Apple,  does  not  change  the  Court’s  conclusion  that  Apple  
is  an  “information  content  provider.”    The Jones court merely adopted  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  
reasoning in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 at 1168, that, if the alleged content provider is not a 
creator of the challenged content, it must have done more than merely “encourage” the creation of 
the challenged conduct; the alleged provider must have required another to create that content.  
ECF No. 501 at 26-27 (quoting Jones, 755 F.3d at 414).  The Court previously considered this 
portion of Roommates,  and  determined  that  Plaintiffs’  allegations were sufficient at this stage to 
survive a CDA challenge.   
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Apple effectively was a creator, at least in part, of the App 
Defendants’  Apps that misappropriated Plaintiffs’ address book data.  ECF No. 478, ¶ 46 (“all  
iDevice  Apps  were  built,  in  part,  by  Apple.”).    Plaintiffs  have  also provided factual detail 
regarding how Apple controlled the development of Apps provided by its App Store, and 
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contributed to the creation of the offensive content, for example, by using its iOS Human Interface 
Guidelines to instruct App developers to access address book data without prior permission.  See, 
e.g., id., ¶¶ 39, 43-53, 88.  This is all the information-content-provider exemption requires:  “The  
term  ‘information  content  provider’  means  any  person  or  entity  that  is  responsible,  in  whole  or  in  
part,  for  the  creation  or  development”  of  the  offending  content.    47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Neither 
Jones nor the new allegations in the SCAC compel the Court to reverse its prior conclusion.  
Apple, as an alleged “information content  provider”  under  the  CDA,  is  not  entitled, as a 
matter of law and at this stage of the proceedings, to blanket CDA immunity for the conduct 
challenged here. 
3. Standing To Assert Conversion Claim 
Apple also alleges that Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their conversion claim, and 
have failed to allege the requisite elements of that claim because Plaintiffs have failed to 
adequately allege an Article III injury, or the element of a property interest, as is required to assert 
their conversion claim.  ECF No. 501 at 21-22.    Apple’s  argument  is  materially  identical  to  the  
App  Defendants’,  and  the Court addresses it in section V.B., infra. 
C. Standing To Seek Injunctive Relief 
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff in federal court must meet three requirements.  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  First, the plaintiff must have 
suffered  an  “injury  in  fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent.  Id. at 560 (citations omitted).  Second, the injury and 
the conduct complained of must be causally connected.  Id. (citation omitted).  Third, it must be 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable decision would redress the injury.  Id. at 
561 (citation omitted). 
A plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief if he  or  she  has  not  alleged  “a  real  or  
immediate  threat”  that  he  or  she  will  be  wronged  again; without such an allegation, a plaintiff fails 
to  show  an  “injury  in  fact,”  and  therefore  to  satisfy  the  first  prong  of  the  standing  inquiry.  City of 
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).  “Past  exposure  to  illegal  conduct  does  not  in  itself  show  
a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, 
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present  adverse  effects.”    O’Shea  v.  Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). 
Apple argues that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled entitlement to injunctive relief.  See 
ECF No. 501 at 22-23.  First, Apple argues that Plaintiffs have pled no facts tending to show that 
the challenged conduct will continue.  Rather, says Apple, Plaintiffs allege in the SCAC that 
Apple  “has  remedied  alleged  gaps  in  its  privacy  protection,”  and  Plaintiffs  have  not  identified  any  
privacy-related statements by Apple, nor “any  incidents  of  unauthorized  upload  of  address book 
data  (or  any  other  user  data)  in  the  past  two  years.”    Id.  Second, Apple argues that Plaintiffs have 
not adequately alleged a threat of repeated injury because they have not alleged that “they intend 
to buy any  more  iPhones,  iPads,  or  iPod  Touches.”  Id. at 23. 
Apple  is  correct  that  Plaintiffs  must  allege  some  degree  of  intent  to  purchase  Apple’s  
iDevices  in  the  future.    As  the  Court  recently  noted,  “the contours of what a plaintiff must claim 
about a future interest in a product in order to have standing to represent a 23(b)(2) class have not 
been defined with precision.”    Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-CV-02998-JST, 2015 WL 
1248027, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015) (footnote omitted).  But it is clear that a Plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief must allege at least a willingness to consider purchasing the product at issue in the 
future.  Id.  Here, Plaintiffs make no such allegation.  Accordingly, they lack standing to seek 
injunctive relief.12   
Plaintiffs also cannot seek injunctive relief against Apple because no realistic threat exists 
that the complained-of conduct is ongoing or will be repeated.  As the Court noted in its earlier 
order, Plaintiffs have alleged that Apple has remedied the alleged gaps in its privacy protection.  
ECF No. 471 39; CAC ¶ 120.  Plaintiffs removed those allegations from the SCAC, and now 
allege that  “Apple’s  foregoing  misconduct  is  ongoing,  and  unless  restrained  by  this  Court,  is  likely  
to  recur.”   ECF No. 478 at ¶ 281.  But because they are contradicted by Plaintiff’s earlier 
allegations, the latest allegations are implausible, and the Court will not accept them as true.  
Smith v. Wilt, No. 12-cv-05451-WHO, 2013 WL 5675897, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013).   
Because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a real or immediate threat of future injury, they lack 
                                                 
12 In  light  of  the  Court’s  conclusion  that  Plaintiffs  lack  standing  for  this  reason,  it  is  not  necessary  
for  the  Court  to  reach  Apple’s  alternative  arguments.   
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standing  to  seek  injunctive  relief.    Plaintiffs’  prayer  for  injunctive  relief,  as  it  pertains  to  Apple,  is  
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  See Zucco, 552 F.3d at 1007. 
II. APP  DEFENDANTS’  MOTIONS  TO  DISMISS13   
Plaintiffs  allege  that  “[e]ach  of  the  App  Defendants  here  created  and  distributed  an  App”  
that  “improperly  invaded  Plaintiffs’  privacy  and  misappropriated  address  book  data  stored  in  the  
iDevices’  Contacts  App  without  authorization  to  do  so.”    ECF No. 478, ¶ 90.  Plaintiffs further 
allege that  they  “were  not  made  aware  of,  nor  did  they  consent  to  the  taking  of  their  data  by  the  
App  Defendants.”    Id., ¶ 92. 
 
A. Copyright Act Preemption 
The App Defendants allege that the Copyright Act preempts both the conversion and the 
invasion of privacy claims that Plaintiffs have alleged.  
Copyright Act preemption has two prongs.  First, the rights at issue under state law must 
be equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act.  Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 
1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)).  Second, the party alleging preemption 
must show that the work at issue comes within the subject matter of copyright.  Id. (citing 17 
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103).  Defendants  point  out  that  “the  scope  of  preemption  is  broader  than  the  scope  
of protection,”  so  that  while  a  “work” may not actually be protected by the Copyright Act, the Act 
may nonetheless preempt state-law protection of the work.  See, e.g., ECF No. 495 at 8 (citing 
Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1212-13, and Endemol  Entm’t  B.V.  v.  Twentieth  Television,  Inc., 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).  Defendants clarify that they do not believe the list of 
address  book  data  contained  in  Plaintiffs’  Contacts  App  qualifies  for  copyright  protection,  but  they  
do believe that the  Copyright  Act  preempts  Plaintiffs’  state-law conversion and intrusion upon 
seclusion claims, which are premised on accessing, transmitting, uploading, and misusing 
Plaintiffs’  address  book  data.  See ECF No. 495 at 8 n.6. 
The  Court  finds  that  The  Copyright  Act  does  not  preempt  Plaintiffs’  conversion  and  
                                                 
13 Many  of  the  App  Defendants’  arguments are identical or nearly identical, and various App 
Defendants adopt the arguments of other App Defendants in their Motions.  See, e.g., ECF No. 
500  at  13.    Thus,  except  where  otherwise  noted,  the  App  Defendants’  arguments  are  addressed  as 
one.  
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intrusion upon seclusion claims, because the  Court  finds  that  both  Plaintiffs’  conversion  and  
invasion of privacy claims are not equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act because they 
involve something “beyond  mere  reproduction  or  the  like.”    G. S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).  Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs have not alleged any act by Defendants beyond  mere  copying  of  users’  address  book  
data.  See, e.g., ECF No. 501 at 8-9; ECF No. 513 at 6-9.  And certain Defendants contend that 
Plaintiffs  consented  to  the  use  of  their  address  book  information  using  a  “Find  Friends”  (or  
equivalent) feature.   
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiffs’  allegations involve more than the mere 
reproduction  of  Plaintiffs’ address book data; they include the unauthorized access, transmission, 
misuse, and misappropriation of that data.  While the particular meanings of  “misuse”  and 
“misappropriate,”  as  alleged  in  Plaintiffs’  complaint,  could  be  more  clear14 (and could include 
copying as part of the alleged misconduct), those terms convey meanings beyond mere 
“reproduction.”  As Yelp and Foodspotting acknowledge, “[e]xamples of [] extra elements 
[preventing Copyright Act preemption] include misappropriation of trade secrets, or improper 
acquisition of  the  work  at  issue  .  .  .  .”    ECF  No.  513  at  6 (emphases added). 
Given the information available at this stage of the proceedings, Defendants have not 
shown that  the  Copyright  Act  preempts  Plaintiffs’  conversion  and  invasion  of  privacy  claims. 
 
B. Conversion 
Under California law, a conversion claim has three elements: (1)  the  plaintiff’s  right  to  
possession or ownership of  a  property  interest;;  (2)  the  defendant’s  conversion  of  the  property  by  a  
wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.  Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 
153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 
1066 (1998)) (alternate citation omitted).  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants converted their address 
book data by accessing, uploading, transmitting, and/or otherwise misappropriating that 
                                                 
14 How  exactly  App  Defendants  “misused”  or  “misappropriated”  users’  address  book  data,  if  they  
did so, is  within  those  Defendants’  sole  knowledge.    Accordingly,  Plaintiffs’  general  pleadings  on  
this point are sufficient.  Cf. Moore, 885 F.2d at 540. 
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information. 
Defendants  contend  that  Plaintiffs’  conversion claim must fail.  Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert such a claim without having identified a legally protected 
interest in their address book data.  Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot show that they 
were dispossessed of any property interest they might have had in the intangible information 
stored in their address books.  And third, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any 
devaluation in any property interest, and therefore cannot satisfy the damages element of their 
conversion claim. 
1. Lack of Article III Standing 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their conversion claim because they 
have failed to allege an injury-in-fact.  At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs bear the burden of 
adequately alleging facts that, if proven, would tend to show that they suffered a constitutionally 
recognized injury.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
Plaintiffs first respond by re-arguing their contention that the common law of conversion 
shows that Plaintiffs have a protectable interest in their contacts information that is injured by 
Defendants’  copying.    The  Court  previously  rejected  this  argument,  finding  that  “Plaintiffs . . . 
[had] failed to allege any details concerning their argument that their address  books’  value  was  
diminished  by  the  App  Defendants’  conduct.”   ECF No. 471 at 40.   
The Plaintiffs provide no reason for the Court to change its mind on this question.  The 
sole new authority they cite involves the misappropriation of indisputably commercial intellectual 
property  ‒  the  songs  of  the  1960’s  popular music group The Turtles.15  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius 
XM Radio Inc., No. CV 13-5693 PSG RZX, 2014 WL 4725382, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) 
(“Flo & Eddie suffered economic harm in the form of foregone licensing or royalty payments for 
the unauthorized performances  of  its  sound  recordings”).    The  other  cases  they  cite  also  deal  with  
                                                 
15 The Court  uses  the  phrase  “1960’s”  even  though  the band is still touring.  See Super Pop! 
Happy Together Tour 2015, at http://theturtles.com/tour/, accessed March 23, 2015.  But their last 
album,  “Turtle  Soup,”  was  released  in  1969,  and  even  their  web  site  describes  them  as  a  “1960’s  
rock  group.”    http://theturtles.com/.   
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the misappropriation of commercial intellectual property.  E.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 
Ceballos, No. 11-CV-5438-LHK, 2012 WL 4009587 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012) (Manny Pacquiao 
v. Antonion Margarito, WBV Light Middleweight Championship Fight Program); DIRECTV, Inc. 
v. Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (interception of DIRECTV’s  satellite  
programming).  These cases shed no light on the commercial value to the plaintiffs of their contact 
lists.   
Plaintiffs also argue that California statutory law confers standing  because  “detriment  
caused  by  the  wrongful  conversion  of  personal  property  is  presumed,”  Cal.  Civ.  Code  § 3336, and 
because nominal damages are always available under California law, Cal. Civ. Code § 3360.  
These arguments are not persuasive.  Section 3336 describes an appropriate measure of damages, 
and does not provide that a plaintiff alleging conversion is entitled to a presumption of injury.  A 
conversion  plaintiff  in  California  court  must  still  prove  “the fact of proximately caused injury.”    
Lueter v. State of Cal., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1303 (2002).  Section 3360 sets forth the rule that a 
plaintiff who has suffered an injury, but whose damages are speculative, is entitled to nominal 
damages.  Hutcherson v. Alexander, 264 Cal. App. 2d 126, 135 (1968).  But the statute does not 
relieve the plaintiff of proving injury.   
Having not alleged a sufficient injury, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their conversion 
claim.  Because  the  Court  previously  dismissed  Plaintiffs’  conversion  claim  on the same basis, the 
Court now dismisses the claim with prejudice.  See Zucco, 552 F.3d at 1007. 
C. Invasion of Privacy (Intrusion Upon Seclusion) 
To allege an invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must plead: (1) the 
defendant’s  intrusion  into  a  private  place,  conversation,  or  matter,  (2)  in  a  manner  highly  offensive  
to a reasonable person.  Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231 (1998).  Defendants 
argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege those elements adequately on several bases.  First, 
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs lack standing.  Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their address book information.  Third, Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs  have  failed,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to  allege  “highly  offensive”  behavior  by  the App 
Defendants.  Finally, Defendants  argue  that  Plaintiffs’  intrusion  upon  seclusion  claim should be 
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dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any harm resulting from their actions, and 
therefore Plaintiffs are unable to prove the element of damages. 
1. Lack of Article III Standing 
Certain App Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their intrusion upon 
seclusion claim because Plaintiffs have failed to identify an injury-in-fact.  See ECF No. 497 at 
10-11; ECF No. 498 at 5-9; ECF No. 499 at 7-10.  As the Court explained in its previous order, 
however, Plaintiffs here have sufficiently pleaded the injury of an invasion of their privacy by 
intrusion upon their seclusion.  ECF No. 471 at 40-41.  Defendants provide no compelling reason 
for the Court to reconsider its prior order.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged an Article III injury. 
 
2. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The App Defendants argue that Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
address book data.  Certain Defendants argue that Plaintiffs consented to at least the accessing of 
their  data  because  they  navigated  through  a  “Find  Friends”  feature (or something equivalent) when 
they signed  up  for  the  App’s services, and agreed to use that feature, which informed them that the 
App would access their address book data.16  The App Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs 
could have had no expectation of privacy in their address books because they were aware that the 
social networking services they signed up for by downloading the Apps required access to 
Plaintiffs’  contacts.     
 
a. Consent 
The  Court  discussed  the  Defendants’  consent  arguments  in  its  prior  order,  and  reasoned  
                                                 
16 Kik makes a similar argument, contending that though Plaintiffs did not navigate through a Find 
Friends-type  screen  and  affirmatively  agree  to  allow  its  App  to  access  Plaintiffs’  address  book  
information,  Plaintiffs  were  aware  almost  immediately  following  the  release  of  Kik’s  App  that  the  
App accessed address book data.  See ECF No. 500 at 6-8.  Thus, argues Kik, Plaintiffs cannot 
plausibly allege they were unaware that its App would access that information, especially given 
that Plaintiffs have not alleged that they downloaded the Kik App prior to the public disclosure of 
Kik’s  access.    Id.  The Court treats this  argument  like  the  other  App  Defendants’  consent  
arguments because, for the purposes of these motions to dismiss, it is not materially distinct from 
those arguments in that, while Plaintiffs may have been aware that Kik accessed address book 
data, they were not aware of other uses to which Kik may have put that information. 
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that though Plaintiffs  who  used  a  “Find  Friends”  function  may  have  knowingly  consented  to  the  
scanning  of  their  address  book  data,  or  other  use  of  the  data  solely  for  the  purpose  of  “Finding  
Friends, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had exceeded the parameters of that consent by 
otherwise transmitting, uploading, storing, and using that information for unauthorized purposes 
or in unauthorized ways.  See ECF No. 471 at 44-45.  Defendants urge the Court to revisit that 
determination on two bases: (1) differing allegations in the SCAC, as compared to the CAC; and 
(2)  the  court’s  decision  in  In re Yahoo Mail Litigation, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
Defendants fault Plaintiffs for condensing the allegations in the SCAC, as compared to 
those in the CAC, regarding the Apps’  alleged misuse of Plaintiffs’  data.  See, e.g., ECF No. 498 
at 10-11.  Contrary  to  Defendants’  characterizations,  however,  Plaintiffs  did  not  “abandon”  or  
“withdraw”  the  CAC’s allegations  that  the  App  Defendants  did  something  more  with  Plaintiffs’  
address book data than merely access it.  Plaintiffs continue to allege that the App Defendants did 
more—by uploading, transmitting, and/or otherwise misusing or misappropriating Plaintiffs’  
address book data—than Plaintiffs were aware or consented to.  See ECF No. 508 at 3-4. 
Also, Yahoo Mail is distinguishable from this case.  There, in the context of the federal 
Wiretap Act, the Court stated that  it  found  “implausible  that  [Yahoo email] users did not—after 
agreeing, based on the [Yahoo Terms of Service], to Yahoo’s  scanning  and  analysis  of  emails—
realize that in order to engage in an analysis of emails, Yahoo would have to store the emails 
somewhere  on  its  servers.”    7  F.  Supp.  3d  at  1031.  But  in  that  case,  Yahoo’s  Additional  Terms  of  
Service expressly informed users that,  “by  scanning  and  analyzing  such  communications  content,  
Yahoo  collects  and  stores  the  data.”    Id. at  1022.    Yahoo’s  consent  page  also  told  users  that  Yahoo  
would scan their e-mails  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  including  to  provide  “targeted  advertising.”    Id.  
No equivalently explicit consent is present here.  As the court in Yahoo explicitly acknowledged, 
in evaluating a consent defense, a court must consider the scope of the alleged consent.  Id. at 
1028.   
Here, in sum, the Court does not find it implausible that, while App users were aware that 
“Find Friends”-type features would scan the address book information stored on their iDevices for 
the sole purpose of finding friends, they were not aware that those features and the Apps with 
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which they were associated used their address book information in other, unauthorized ways.17  
Neither the changes to the SCAC, nor Yahoo Mail, compel the Court to revisit its earlier 
determination  that  Plaintiffs’  intrusion  upon  seclusion  claim  survives  Defendants’  consent 
arguments. 
 
b. The  App  Defendants’  Actions Were Necessary To Provide Social 
Networking Services 
Defendants’  argument  that  Plaintiffs  could  not  have  had  a  reasonable  expectation  of  
privacy  in  their  address  book  data  because  the  “Find  Friends”  features  they signed up for required 
access  to  Plaintiffs’  address  book  data  fails  for  the  same  reason  that  Defendants’  consent  argument  
does.  Plaintiffs allege not only that App Defendants accessed their address book information and 
used  it  to  “Find  Friends,”  but that the Apps also uploaded, misused, and/or misappropriated that 
data.    To  the  extent  that  Apps  used  Plaintiffs’  information  for  something  other  than  purely  
“Finding  Friends,”  Plaintiffs  retained  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  that  information. 
3. Offensiveness 
The Court previously found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the App 
Defendants’  actions  satisfied  the  “highly  offensive”  prong  of  their  intrusion  upon  seclusion  claim.    
See ECF No. 471 at 45-46.  Defendants contend that the Court should revisit that conclusion in 
light  of  (1)  Plaintiffs’  alleged consent; and (2) allegations in the SCAC that materially differ from 
those in the CAC.  The Court has already rejected both arguments.  See section V.C.2.a., supra. 
Plaintiffs have also pointed to evidence indicating that at least some iDevice users found 
the  Apps’  accessing  of  address book information highly offensive—i.e., the response from 
Congress, the FTC, the public, and the media to learning that Apps were accessing and using 
address book information in the manner herein alleged. 
4. Adequacy of Damages Allegations 
In  a  final  bid  to  seek  dismissal  of  Plaintiffs’  intrusion  upon  seclusion  claim,  Defendants  
                                                 
17 After further factual development, Defendants may succeed in demonstrating that the 
parameters  of  Plaintiffs’  consent  was  coterminous  with  Defendants’  use  of  that  data.    But  that  is a 
matter that cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.   
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contend that the claim must fail because Plaintiffs have failed adequately to allege damages.  See, 
e.g., ECF No. 499 at 17; 500 at 11.  The only authority that Defendants cite for this proposition is 
the  Court’s  prior  order  (and  citations  therein),  which  found  Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient.  ECF 
No. 471 at 46. 
In  the  SCAC,  Plaintiffs  allege  again,  generally,  that  they  suffered  “harm  and  damages”  as  a  
result  of  Defendants’  intrusion  upon  their  seclusion.    ECF  No.  478,  ¶  248.    These  allegations  
remain sufficient for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.   
CONCLUSION 
For  the  reasons  set  forth  above,  Plaintiff’s  conversion claim and requests for injunctive 
relief are hereby dismissed with prejudice.  In all other respects, the motions to dismiss are denied.   
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  March 23, 2015 
 
 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 
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